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Abstract Network security monitoring remains a chal-
lenge. As global networks scale up, in terms of traffic,
volume and speed, effective attribution of cyber attacks
is increasingly difficult. The problem is compounded by
a combination of other factors, including the architec-
ture of the Internet, multi-stage attacks and increasing
volumes of nonproductive traffic. This paper proposes
to shift the focus of security monitoring from the source
to the target. Simply put, resources devoted to detec-
tion and attribution should be redeployed to efficiently
monitor for targeting and prevention of attacks. The
effort of detection should aim to determine whether
a node is under attack, and if so, effectively prevent
the attack. This paper contributes by systematically
reviewing the structural, operational and legal reasons
underlying this argument, and presents empirical evi-
dence to support a shift away from attribution to favour
of a target-centric monitoring approach. A carefully de-
ployed set of experiments are presented and a detailed
analysis of the results is achieved.
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1 Introduction
Network security monitoring poses a huge challenge.
Cyber attacks are increasingly significant in terms of
their disruptive and destructive impact; recent attacks [4,
53] serve as a reminder. As global networks scale up,
both in terms of traffic volume and speed, the problem
of detection of such activity is only going to get worse.
What is it about modern networks that makes security
monitoring such a challenge?
In particular, attribution is very difficult to achieve.
This is demonstrated over and again, firstly, with the
attack on Estonia in 2007, often cited as a first real
instance of a cyber attack, with significant impact on
the countrys critical infrastructure [34]. While this is
attributed to non-state actors (with possible state sup-
port) from Russia [34], the fact remains that there was
no official attribution to a state sponsor.
Stuxnet is another instance of a sophisticated cyber
weapon purposefully-launched to target critical nuclear
infrastructure in Iran (ultimately affecting other sys-
tems beyond just Iran). A careful examination of the
malware only serves to prove that significant resources
have been deployed to launch it successfully [16]; we
have to acknowledge the current environment where
several state and non-state actors have emerged to bear
such capability [38]. Attribution to Israel and USA is
of little comfort therefore [36]. Current policy discourse
on cyber attribution is therefore heavily influenced by
geopolitics. This fails to serve the agenda on effective
network security monitoring as it ignores a complex
threat from a variety of emerging state and non-state
actors, amongst them insiders, who pose a real threat.
Finally, the recent attacks on Sony and the doubts
whether North Korea was behind the attacks [47] makes
a compelling case for the agenda of attribution to be in-
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formed by technological challenges that exist. The pur-
pose of this paper is to bring to light a variety of tech-
nological considerations that need to inform policy on
attribution. We move beyond the current discourse and
propose that we shift our focus on target-centric moni-
toring, which could offer a better potential for detection
and could serve as an early warning system. This paper
presents theoretical results to support this claim.
1.1 Rest of the paper
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
motivates the reader and makes a constructive case for
reconsidering attribution in network security monitor-
ing. Section 3 reviews related work in this area and sys-
tematically points out other research that looks at net-
work security monitoring but face similar challenges of
achieving effective attribution. Section 4 describes the
monitoring algorithm we use to demonstrate how shift-
ing security monitoring from a focus on attribution to
target-centric monitoring could be more effective. Sec-
tion 5 presents the results of our empirical work and
a detailed analysis for the benefit of the reader. Sec-
tion 6 presents a discussion and further reflection, and
concludes the paper.
2 Motivation
We motivate the problem on a variety of fronts includ-
ing structural, operational and legal issues.
The technical architecture of cyberspace has its roots
in connectivity and not accountability. Clark and Lan-
dau, experts in this area, have noted the problem of
attribution and carefully examined solutions to tie to-
gether personally identifiable information with packet
layer attribution, which they appropriately call the ex-
treme of the accountable Internet [19]. The current ar-
chitecture of the Internet does not permit such a pro-
vision, and any attempt to conceive of one, even at a
technical level (by manipulating the IP layer), is not
straightforward.
Moreover, multi-stage attacks, which most modern
cyber attacks are, make it impossible to do any reliable
attribution (for accountability and identification) [19].
Such attacks are realised when an attacker manages to
use a different machine to launch an attack on the final
target. There are multiple stages involved: the attacker
would first compromise an intermediary machine and
set it up to attack the final target; there may be several
such machines, with each being used to compromise an-
other. Once a complex web of anonymous mechanisms
is set up, the attacker can then use these machines as
a launchpad for the final attack; in some instances this
activity carries on to allow for data exfiltration (illegal
transfer out of data) to go on over a period of time, for
example.
The ultimate aim here is to avoid any attribution
back to the original attacker. There are secondary aims
of trying to rally up as much computing power as pos-
sible to launch attacks using a higher communications
bandwidth for maximum effect. Such stepping stones
would ideally be found in foreign countries where for-
eign legal jurisdiction makes it even more difficult to
carry out any post-incident response. Such is the ap-
peal of this approach that several compromised ma-
chines are already controlled, commonly known as bot-
nets, by botnet operators who lease out these machines
in what has become an established trade in the cyber-
crime underground economy. Needless to say, effective
attribution through such a clandestine infrastructure is
near impossible.
From an operational perspective, an examination of
Internet traffic characteristics reveals an increasing vol-
ume of “non-productive traffic” [39], which is essentially
due to a variety of benign and malicious reasons, achiev-
ing no purpose. Non-productive traffic takes form in a
variety of ways including
– continually growing scanning activity on public net-
works, partly due to search engines (like Google)
collecting and indexing content for efficient search
results (using technologies like Googlebot) [37]. The
difficulty here arises from differentiating between le-
gitimate scans to malicious attempts;
– backscatter traffic, which is essentially response traf-
fic from other scanning and attack activity ongoing
in cyberspace [39]; and
– a plethora of other network packet floating around
due to misconfigured hosts and administrative er-
rors.
Most of such Internet traffic is essentially defunct by the
time it is visible on security sensors, but may still resem-
ble genuine malicious attempts. Important to note here
however is the difficulty this introduces for detecting
purposeful malicious activity (targeted and deliberately
designed attacks). This problem particularly manifests
itself in the form of “high false positives”, essentially
mistakes made by security monitoring infrastructure
failing to distinguish real attacks from benign activ-
ity. The ever increasing volume of such non-productive
traffic, porportionally to rising Internet traffic, makes
the problem of effective attribution only worse.
Beyond the technical, the increasing nature of state-
sponsorship of large-scale cyber attacks means that na-
tion states have to identify hostile states initiating the
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attack. The only problem is that launch pads for most
such attacks are found to be in non-hostile states [3],
against which the victim state could only respond by
applying the unwilling or unable test [22]. This is an
underlying principle of international law which asserts
that retaliation against an intermediary state used by
an enemy to launch an attack is only permissible if the
intermediary is either unwilling or unable to prevent
the aggressor responsible from doing so.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty posed by any retal-
iatory cyber-attack is the geopolitics of the day. Po-
litical alliances, intelligence sharing, legal and ethical
considerations, and potential sensitivity of offensive op-
erations, all make it very difficult for nation states to
launch such operations. The result is that the sort of
public accusations of cyber attacks seen in the press
and meant as a tool of deterrence are almost entirely
useless. Essentially, the value of attribution to provide
deterrence is increasingly futile.
On reflection one finds an opportunity to recon-
sider network security monitoring efforts. Perhaps then
a shift of focus from security monitoring of the source
to the target could provide for better network defence?
Simply put, resources devoted to detection and attribu-
tion could be redeployed to efficiently monitor for tar-
geting and prevention of attacks. Detection should aim
to determine whether a node is under attack, and if so,
effectively prevent the attack. This is a radical change
whereby the cost of monitoring [43, 44] could be dra-
matically lowered and malicious activity is curbed at a
much earlier stage in the attack cycle.
3 Related work
To demonstrate our idea of target centric monitoring we
use a Bayesian-based traffic monitoring approach. Us-
ing Bayesian technique and its variants for intrusions
detection can be found in [17, 18, 20, 45, 52]. The rel-
evance of information fusion for network security mon-
itoring can be found in [12, 15, 40, 48]. A scalable so-
lution to identify insiders in a Bayesian framework is
proposed in [17, 18]. A base line is defined and if a user
profile is deviated from it an alarm is raised [8, 32]. Basu
et al [2] uses connection based windows to detect low
profile attacks with a confidence measure. Using multi-
ple neural network classifiers to detect stealthy probes
can be found in [46]. Evidence accumulation as a means
of detection is proposed in [26]. Brynielsson et al [11]
apply the same idea in a different domain (detecting
lone wolf terrorists). Berk et al [5] combines traditional
notion of Motive, Means, and Opportunity with be-
havioural analysis techniques to place each individual
on a sliding scale of insider risk. Users’ behaviour is
compared both to their own baselines and to the be-
haviours of members in their peer groups, using the Eu-
clidean distance. Eldardiry et al [23] proposes a method
for detecting insiders with unusual changes in behaviour
by providing a method to combine anomaly indicators
from multiple sources of information for building a global
model. Authors find outliers in that global model by
comparing each user’s activity changes to activity changes
of his peer group. Axelrad et al [1] defines a Bayesian
network model that incorporates psychological variables
that indicate degree of interest in a potential malicious
insider. Using a complex Bayesian networks to capture
conditional dependencies between different attributes
can be found in [20]. Chivers et al [18] demonstrate
Bayesian approach is superior to the counting algo-
rithm.
With respect to the Target-centric monitoring there
is no established literature. Whyte et al [49] offer a dif-
ferent direction for security monitoring by proposing
a class of scanning detection algorithms that focus on
what is being scanned for instead of who is scanning.
But such an approach is not completely independent
from the source information either. It uses the source
information of scan packets for victim detection. Our
approach does not require any information about the
source. It completely depends on destination informa-
tion and allows for any suspicious event on the network
to be accounted for. Most importantly, we acknowledge
two types of uncertainties (motivation and source) of
events as defined in [30, 31] in a Bayesian framework.
Hence though we inspired by [49] our effort is different.
The motivation behind choosing a probabilistic ap-
proach for profiling is that a network event is not al-
ways easy to judge for malicious nature. Some suspi-
cious events can appear as part of an attack signa-
ture as well as originate from benign network activity.
For example, a major router failure could generate a
flood of ICMP unreachable messages while some ma-
licious program (viruses and worms) may generate the
same for probing; such uncertainty needs to be acknowl-
edged [27, 28, 29, 31]. We use a Bayesian technique to
achieve this. Figure 1 is to demonstrate the need for
acknowledging the event uncertainty in monitoring. In
Figure 1, left graph obtained via the proposed approach
in this paper, and using the same trace, right graph was
obtained via the simple counting method. This type of
counting method is used in heuristics developed in [49].
Proposed method is an anomaly detection based
approach. In recent years numerous anomaly-based in-
trusion detection approaches have been proposed, but
most of them are generic and simple [13, 33, 41]. Most
of current incremental anomaly detection approaches
have either high rate of false alarms, or suffer scalabil-
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ity issues, or are not fit for deployment in high-speed
networks (refer to survey paper [6]). Hence they are
different from our approach which is minimal in terms
of monitoring overhead and hence has the potential to
scale up very well for large network topologies.
Importantly, all above approaches for network mon-
itoring are source centric or use source information at
some stage of the detection. But proposed approach in
this paper is completely independent from the source
information in monitoring. Hence this work is unique.
4 Bayesian-based traffic monitoring
The underlying idea of this paper is that network secu-
rity monitoring should move from trying to attribute
activity to suspicious sources to the targets of criti-
cal assets in a network system. To demonstrate this,
we use an existing monitoring algorithm of same au-
thors. In this section we provide substantial information
about the monitoring algorithm, interesting readers are
invited to refer [27, 28, 29, 31] for more information.
4.1 Monitoring Algorithm
Chivers et al [17, 18] use Bayes’ formula for combining
evidence from multiple sources to identify the source of
suspicious activities. This is further developed by Kalu-
tarage [27] to standardise profile scores using Z-Scores
along with the concept of statistical normality. The
problem of detection is broken down to two sub prob-
lems: profiling and analysis.
Profiling is the method for evidence fusion across
space and time by updating node profiles dynamically
based on changes in evidence. Simply put, we compute
a suspicion score using the hypothesis given below for
each node in the system during a smaller time window
w, and that score is updated as time progresses to com-
pute a node score for a lager observation window W .
4.2 Building the Hypothesis
Let E ={E1=e1, E2=e2, E3=e3,...,Em=em} be the set
of all suspicious evidence observed against node k dur-
ing time t from m different independent observation
spaces. Hk is the hypothesis that k
th node being a vic-
tim of attacker(s). The node score is then calculated as
follows.
p(Hk/E) =
∏
j
p(ej/Hk).p(Hk)∑
i
∏
j
p(ej/Hi).p(Hi)
(1)
Once the likelihood p(ej/Hi) and the prior p(Hi)
are known p(Hk/E) can be calculated. Note that the
profiling technique we use in this work can combines
information gathered from different sources into a sin-
gle score for a minimum computational cost. It reduces
data into a single value which is important to maintain
information about node activities for a W . The poste-
rior probability terms (p(Hk/E)) can be accumulated
by time and used as a metric to distinguish victims from
other nodes. Node scores are updated at the end of each
w by considering all the evidence observed during that
period. Extending our approach to a very large scale
attack surface is very simple as it is a matter of adding
a new indicator (attack vector) in E. Existing domain
knowledge will serve to enhance the performance of our
monitoring algorithm since it takes advantage of prior
knowledge about the parameters. Which is especially
useful when technical data is scarce. However prior and
likelihoods are the most critical parameters to our ap-
proach since Bayes factors are sensitive to them.
The analysis comprised of detecting anomalous pro-
files in a given set of node profiles. A statistical method
is used to detect anomalies. Two techniques are used:
Peer analysis and Discord analysis. Both techniques ac-
knowledge the fact that baseline behaviour on networks
is not necessarily stable. For example, operational or ex-
ercise deployments often mean the behaviour of nodes
will potentially change dramatically.
4.3 Peer analysis
Aggregating short period (w) estimations over time helps
to accumulate relatively weak evidence for long periods
W . These accumulated probability terms
∑
w
p(Hk/E),
known as node scores (χ), can be used as a measure-
ment of the level of suspicion for a given node at any
given time. For a given set of node profiles (e.g. profiles
corresponding to a similar peer group), the univariate
version of Grubb’s test [25] is used to detect anomalous
points. For each profile score χ, its z score is computed
as:
z =
χ− χ¯
s
(2)
Where χ¯ and s are mean and standard deviation of
data set. A test instance is declared to be anomalous at
significance level α if z is greater than Grubbs’ critical
value (GC).
GC =
N − 1√
N
√√√√ t2α/N,N−2
N − 2 + t2α/N,N−2
(3)
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Fig. 1 A Comparison: Probabilistic vs Deterministic approaches. Vi denotes victim nodes while min and max denote minimum
and maximum node scores of normal nodes in the same subnet.
where N is the number of profile points in the set,
and tα/N,N−2 is the value taken by a t-distribution (one
tailed test) at the significance level of αN and degrees
of freedom (N − 2). The α reflects the confidence asso-
ciated with the threshold and indirectly controls the
number of profiles declared as anomalous [12]. Note
that the threshold adjusts itself according to current
state of a network. This is a vertical analysis to detect
one’s aberrant behaviour with respect to her peers. In
other words it compares each node’s activity changes
to activity changes of her peer group. Note that this
analysis technique accounts for regular variations such
as diurnal and familiarity. Looking at one’s aberrant
behaviour within a similar peer group gives better re-
sults in terms of false alarms than setting a universal
baseline for the entire network [5, 23].
4.4 Discord analysis
When an attack is progressing malicious activities are
occurring according to an on-off pattern in time. As a
result, lack of agreement or harmony between points
in the profile sequence of a given node can occur in a
similar or different on-off fashion. This type of anoma-
lies are known as discords [51]. These discords are ran-
dom time context and peer analysis technique itself is
not sufficient to detect them if the progression rate of
malicious activities is far lower than the similar inno-
cent activities. The Graph shown in Figure 2 presents
such a situation. The objective of this analysis is to
detect sub-sequences within a given sequence of pro-
files which is anomalous with respect to the rest of
the sequence. Problem formulation occurs in time-series
data sets where data is in the form of a long sequence
and contains regions that are anomalous. The under-
lying assumption is that the normal behaviour of the
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Fig. 2 Hiding behind innocent nodes (See magnified version
in Figure 3) (quoted from [27]).
.
time-series follows a defined random pattern, and a
sub-sequence within the long sequence which does not
conform to this pattern is an anomaly. In general, the
purpose of this analysis is to detect one’s aberrant be-
haviour with respect to her own behaviour regardless
of her peers.
At the (t−1)th time point, using an auto-regressive
integrated moving average model ARIMA(p, d, q) [14]
which describes the auto-correlations in the data, 95%
Confidence Interval (CI) for the tth profile score is pre-
dicted (see Figures 4 and 5). If the observed profile
score at time t lies outside of the predicted CI then
absolute deviation of the profile score from CI is calcu-
lated, for example the distance between points P1 and
P2 in Figure 4. This deviation is used as a measure of
non-conformity of a given profile score to the pattern of
its own sequence (group norms). These deviations aver-
age out over the time to calculate the anomaly score for
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Fig. 3 Magnified version of Figure 2 - red dotted line denotes
the attacker, all other lines denote innocent nodes (quoted
from [27]).
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Fig. 4 Node scores and 95% CI intervals for the attacker
node. Black lines denote CIs while the red line denotes the
attacker (A) (quoted from [27]).
a given node. Note that this anomaly score is the av-
erage dissimilarity of profile scores with its own profile
sequence of a node. This dissimilarity occurs randomly
from time to time due to the deliberate intervention of
the attacker. A node does exhibit sudden changes in
behaviour when compared to its past behaviour is not
necessarily suspicious as it could be a regular variation
of the node behaviour [23]. Discord analysis technique
uses in this work considers such variations as completely
legitimate as it monitoring for changes to the changing
pattern of node behaviour.
5 Experimental Set up and Results
We simulate a network with a set of attackers. We pro-
file for both source and target of attackers using the
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Fig. 5 Node scores and 95% CIs for a normal node. Black
lines denote CIs while the green line denotes the normal node
(N) (quoted from [27]).
above algorithm. We then compare the two analyses to
offer insight into whether the source- or target-centric
approach is more effective.
As it is very difficult to evaluate a novel algorithm
based on live (or any raw) network traffic, very of-
ten simulation methods or some benchmark datasets
(e.g. DARPA - KDD99 [35]) are used by researchers
for evaluations of their algorithms [7]. However most
of such datasets are also simulated traffic on real net-
works. Despite the significant contributions of bench-
mark datasets their accuracy and ability to reflect real
world conditions has been extensively criticised [9, 10].
Therefore we set up a network, as shown in Figure 6,
in a simulated environment using the network simula-
tor ns-3. Poison arrival model was assumed to generate
traffic patterns of interest. The simulation was run for
a period of time to ensure that enough traffic was gen-
erated.
The network has ten subnets varying the size be-
tween 50 and 2, and any node is free to communicate
with any other. Three attackers A1, A2, A3 are planted
in three subnets sizes 10, 25 and 50 respectively. All
three attackers are launching attacks on two targets V1
and V2 in a given server farm. Anomalous traffic by
means of unusual port numbers was generated in ad-
dition to generating usual traffic within and between
subnets and to external networks. If λs, λn are mean
rates of generating suspicious events by suspicious and
normal nodes (i.e. the noise) respectively, we ensure
maintaining λs = λn±3
√
λn and λn(≤ 0.1) sufficiently
smaller for our experiment to characterise suspicious
activities. The idea to use the above relationship for
generating attacker activities was to keep them within
the normality range of innocent activities (i.e. back-
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Fig. 6 Network topology: A run time instance.
ground noise).
√
λn is the standard deviation of rates
of suspicious events generated by normal nodes.
5.1 Prior and Likelihoods
The motivation behind the detection algorithm is that a
network event is not always easy to judge for malicious
nature. Some suspicious events can appear as part of
an attack signature as well as originate from benign
network activity. For example, a major router failure
could generate a flood of ICMP unreachable messages
while some malicious program (viruses and worms) may
generate the same for probing; such uncertainty needs
to be acknowledged [28, 29].
Prior probabilities and Likelihoods are assigned as
follows.
p(H1) =
1
2
= 0.5 (4)
Equation 4 assumes that there is a 50% chance for a
given node to be a victm. However, this is not the case
in many situations. A node may have a higher prior
belief of being a victim, such as a web server, than an
ordinary client node. Since prior probabilities are based
on previous experiences, p(H1) can be judged based on
information gathered from contextual analysis. How-
ever if there is no basis to distinguish between nodes or
groups of nodes equally likely (i.e.same probability of
occurring) can be assumed. Alternatively the posterior
probability of node k at time t − 1 can be used as the
prior of the same node at time t. This lets prior prob-
abilities to adjust itself dynamically according to the
suspicious evidences observed over time.
Likelihoods are assigned using
p(ej/Hi) = k (5)
where for all j ,i. 5 denotes that the likelihoods of see-
ing the event ej at a node when it is a victim of an at-
tack. For the purposes of demonstration, arbitrary val-
ues (≤1) for k are assigned to distinguish different types
of events produced in the given scenario simulation.
In actual implementation estimations of these types of
likelihoods could be drawn from common classes of at-
tacks and preconfigured normal traffic; solutions to em-
pirically analyse day-to-day traffic and build statistical
models of normal behaviour exist [21] for such purposes.
We present our experimental outcomes under four
different cases. The cardinality of attacker to victim
relationship in each case can be described as follows.
The idea is to see whether target centric monitoring is
sensitive to number of attackers and victims in the scene
as our monitoring approach is aggregating profiles.
– One to one (1:1) - one attacker sends suspicious
packets to only one target in the system
– One to Many (1:M) - three attackers send suspicious
packets to only one target in the system
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– Many to one (M:1) - one attacker sends suspicious
packets to only two targets
– Many to many (N:M) - three attackers send suspi-
cious packets to only two targets
5.2 Target-centric monitoring
Graphs in Figure 7 present monitoring outcomes by
means of detection. Since we utilise the destination in-
formation of activities, our approach detects the targets
of attackers (see Figure 7). Min and Max represent the
minimum and maximum profile scores of normal nodes
in each subnet where target node (denoted by V or Vi
in graphs) is located. GC represents the Grubbs’ criti-
cal value (threshold) for targets’ subnet (i.e. the server
farm). As is obvious from Figure 7, the proposed ap-
proach is capable of detecting targets of attack activi-
ties successfully in all four cases considered here. While
the target is cut-off (or very close to) the threshold
(GC), all other normal nodes in the target’s subnet is
significantly below from the threshold during the mon-
itoring period.
However the M:1 case (single origin of activities, but
many destinations) is significant. Only V1 is above the
threshold, and V2 is among the normal nodes. How-
ever this should not be mistaken as the proposed ap-
proach is false negative on detecting V2 in this case.
In this case victim V1 can be detected very early than
detecting the corresponded attacker A (please compare
with M:1 case in figure 8). Once V1 is detected and
prevented, then that case is turned into an 1:1 case
which the victim can be detected very quickly than the
attacker. Hence in M:1 case too both victims can be
detected earlier using destination utilised monitoring
approach than using the source utilised monitoring ap-
proach. Essentially, M:1 and 1:1 cases do not represent
source collusion/distributed slow activities. We simu-
lated these two (M:1 and 1:1) cases to see how pro-
posed approach works on both. Specially, M:N and 1:M
cases are very important here as both cases simulate the
clouded and/or distributed type slow activities. As ob-
vious from the experimental results destination utilised
monitoring approach performs well in both cases.
5.3 A Comparison
This section compares target centric monitoring to tra-
ditional attribution-based approaches. The comparison
is made under two different perspectives: first, compar-
ing the actual detection on temporal aspects, and sec-
ond, comparing the detection potentials.
5.3.1 Early detection
This perspective compares how early is abnormal ac-
tivity detected using both approaches. To enable this
comparison figure 8 was obtained using the same trace
and the same Bayesian model used to obtain figure 7.
The only change we made in obtaining graphs in figure 8
is utilising the source information of activities in pro-
filing instead of destination information. Min and Max
represent the minimum and maximum profile scores of
normal nodes in each subnets where attack node (Ai)
is located. GC represents the Grubbs’ critical value
(threshold) for attacker’s subnet.
The results suggest that the victim-based approach
is very quicker than the attribution-based approach in
all cases (compare graphs in figures 7 and 8 tempo-
rally) in detection of the slow suspicious activities. In-
terestingly, in most cases presented in figure 8, source
utilised monitoring approach failed to detect slow sus-
picious activities during the monitored period. In some
cases activities are detected using the source utilised
monitoring, however, after a considerable lag compared
to the destination utilised monitoring approach.
5.3.2 Detection potential
A simple measure called detection potential is defined
to explain how far an attacker node is deviated from
the threshold. It helps to compare between different
network conditions. The detection potential d is defined
as:
d = z −GC (6)
on the basis of the higher the detection potential the
better for the detection. Figure 9 compares the detec-
tion potential across the two approaches in each cases.
As is obvious from Figure 9, the target-centric ap-
proach has a higher detection potential in all four cases.
This means that there is a higher chance of detection of
suspicious activities using our approach than most tra-
ditional source-centric approaches. Most importantly,
detection potential of the source-centric approach has
higher variations (fluctuations) while detection poten-
tial of target oriented approach is more stable. This is
a good indication to imply that source oriented mon-
itoring may have more false negatives (and positives)
than target-centric monitoring approach. Future work
will build on this further to establish this principle for
actual real network examples where a diverse set of at-
tack cases are prevalent.
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Fig. 7 Target centric monitoring. The cardinality of attacker to victim relationship in each case is described in section 5
6 Discussion
The purpose of this paper is to convey the core prin-
ciple. No doubt this has to manifest itself in a variety
of design principles, mechanisms and strategies that we
hope will follow: recent work suggests that this is in-
creasingly acknowledged within the wider security re-
search community. Exposure maps are one such exam-
ple [49, 50] where nodes are profiled for potential at-
tack vectors available to an attacker and traffic activity
is then assessed for port scanning attempts. An adap-
tive approach to network traffic analysis would also be
welcome to address selective monitoring and collection
of packets. Little research has considered this problem.
One hardware-based approach to characterise unlikely
uninteresting traffic more cheaply that can be devoid
of further more expensive software-based analysis ex-
ists [24]; this is demonstrated to be effective for poten-
tial Gigabit Ethernet operations. However, further work
is needed to allow for traffic monitoring to be sensitive
to the type of services a given node may be vulnerable
against. This will help avoid undue attention to suspi-
cious traffic that will not prove harmful.
One difficulty with attribution discussed earlier is
that attacks are carried out in multiple stages using
compromised machines as stepping stones (or in the
form of botnets). The focus on targeted nodes takes
into account the importance of preventing such com-
promise, which in itself should help to undermine at-
tacks. Make no mistake that attribution remains im-
portant but this is best left to be carried out by ded-
icated cybercrime units, perhaps operating at regional
or national level providing for a coordinated response
for potential attribution. Only then are the complexities
involved in responding to large-scale organised attacks
could be overcome both technically and otherwise.
This paper proposed a method to combine the out-
put of several information sources to a single score. It
acts as a data reduction method and enables to propose
a lightweight monitoring scheme for the problem which
is essential in near-real-time analysis of slow, sophisti-
cated targeted attacks. It promises scalable means for
detection. Experimental results offer a promise for the
feasibility of target detection in network security mon-
itoring.
Target-centric monitoring provides for effective de-
tection of slow and suspicious activities as one does
not have to rely on possible source aggregation. Note
there is no guarantee that a publicly visible source of
an event is the authentic source. Source-centric mon-
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Fig. 8 Source centric monitoring. The cardinality of attacker to victim relationship in each case is described in section 5
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Fig. 9 A comparison of detection potential for each case.
itoring is vulnerable to this. Attacker tactics such as
source collusion and source address spoofing are com-
mon and therefore make such attacker detection very
hard. It becomes worse if the attack is stealthy as cur-
rent computational constraints do not permit to main-
tain attack state over extended periods of times to cor-
relate between suspicious events. This could be particu-
larly useful for monitoring of high-profile nodes that are
at particular risk from sophisticated insider attacks or
purposefully designed cyber weapons. The focus on tar-
geted nodes takes into account the importance of pre-
venting such compromise, which in itself should help to
undermine attacks. The main contribution of this paper
is a shift to the focus of analysis.
Our approach should not be mistaken as a host
based monitoring scheme. It focuses the event analy-
sis stage of a monitoring system. Most of existing mon-
itoring schemes share a common feature which we called
source-centric analysis. They perform analysis based on
source information (in fact perceived last hop) of activ-
ity either it is a host based or a network based monitor-
ing system, and utilise that information at some stage
of detection assuming that suspicious activity can be
attributed to a meaningful specific source or an inter-
mediate [49]. In a modern network such an assumption
is not valid anymore. As mentioned in [42], most of the
existing solutions become less effective when the attack
is launched from distributed sources. We consider the
actual reason behind such a deficiency is that their de-
pendency on the Source IP addresses (or perceived last
hop) of activities for attack detection, i.e. the source-
centric analysis. What we propose in this paper is to
move away from source-centric analysis to destination-
centric analysis. Note that this should not be mistaken
as a host based monitoring scheme, as it is not a prob-
lem of location of IDS deployment. It is a matter of
whether monitoring system depends on source infor-
mation of activities for attack detection or not.
Our method completely depends only on informa-
tion within the control and ignores depending on any
source information to protect networks. This work demon-
strated the core principle taking into account the im-
portance of preventing such compromise. Moreover, our
approaches to tracing the source of such activity and a
target-centric method to monitoring offer means to sig-
nificantly improve network security monitoring against
increasing volumes of traffic, spoofing attempts and col-
lusion.
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